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The political economy of hunting is one of the neglected fields of
South African social history. Hunting wild animals as an occupation
within settler and indigenous societies was for at least two hundred
years, between 1670 and 1870, essential for survival, subsistence and
often for the creation of income and capital. By the end of the
1890s, however, European rule and merchant capitalism had, by their
efforts to subjugate nature brought about the almost complete
destruction of wild-life on the sub-continent. As a result, by the
beginning of the 20th century, hunting had become a closely regulated
pastime for a very small group of well-to-do Angliphone and Afrikaner
settlers and a forbidden means of acquiring a subsistence for an
equally small group of Africans and Afrikaner poachers. For the
poachers wild life represented an ultimately ineffective way of
staving off what had become an inevitable process of prole-
tarianisation. To the new men of wealth, property and power in the
post South African war era - company promoters and directors, stock
brokers, share jobbers, senior mining engineers and managers, lawyers,
medical men and journalists - hunting was one important means of
creating a new corporate identity. Hunting, crucially because it was
associated with British landed upper classes was seen to provide an
ethos for creating and transforming a gentry. Although this ethos
drew on older notions of ' sportsmanship' these had been transformed
and given an African context by several generations of Victorian
hunter-authors whose writings had presented Africa and its wild- life
as a vast natural resource waiting to be subjugated. It was from this
literature that the new men of a reconstructing and industrialising
Transvaal obtained many of their images, images which were employed to
turn themselves into a ruling class. Hunting or 'sport' was to
provide them - so they believed - with an exclusive and a newly
established common life style which would barr outsiders as much as it
barred poor blacks and poor whites. For the new ruling class hunting
could create, metaphorically, as well as literally, a monopoly of
consumption, the ultimate objective of a ruling group seeking to
enforce its power. By the end of the 19th century the acquisition of
these African hunting-fields enabled members of settler classes, as
they began to take root, to relate to their metropolitan equivalents
on increasingly equal terms. Thus when Randolph Churchill, whose
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influence was power, it was hoped could be used to influence the City
and the Colonial Office to be well disposed to mining adventures,
visited the Transvaal in 1890, he was taken hunting on the Lewis and
Marks farms of the Vereeniging Estates.
This was a strange and effete transformation of what had been so
essential an activity and which for the settlers of the mid-17th
century had begun as a means of defence against wild animals and as a
way of making good an otherwise large shortfall in food supplies. The
demands of commercialism, which got under way after settlement began,
rapidly transformed hunting into a war against animals. In the late
17th and 18th centuries successive generations of young men from the
new settlement used such capital as they had for hunting expeditions
in the hope that the return from elephant hunting would enable them to
establish themselves as landowners, cattle keepers and farmers. Out
of the commercial hunt a new social phenomenon emerged, the
j atersgemeenskap (hunters community). The mystique which surrounds
hunting would suggest that the j agtersgemeenskap was an egalitarian
brotherhood but in reality its members were unequal. Not all of those
who went on the hunt had equal resources to contribute to shared
equipment. In the 19th century, or probably earlier, this was
overcome by the hunters being financed by a trader or by others with
resources in return for which the financier got a half share of the
profit. But even more important a very large part of any 18th and
19th century expedition was made up of unfree clients who were
included in the expeditions by their masters. Hunting expeditions
were remembered in the white collective consciousness as arcadian
affairs. In spite of the fact that hunting generally involved danger,
intense fear, riding and shooting injuries, severe cuts from thorn
trees, much discomfort and the continuous possibilities of disease,
only its rare excitement, its conviviality and leisurely pace were
recalled. The fact that hunting removed men from the hard and regular
work which agriculture or pastoralism required must have contributed
considerably to the myth of the male idyll with its legendary
implications of unfettered well being known as the lekker lewe (the
good life). It survived late into the 19th century, as we shall see.
Hunting became important, not only for the profit it produced, and for
the possibility of accumulation without the long grind of daily
labour. It also served as a form of bonding and initiation for the
young white men of settler society.
The j agtersgemeenskap took a very large toll of animal life, even
with the weapons available to the 18th century hunter. As a result
the officers of the Dutch East India Company (DEIC), who had made
feeble attempts to restrict the destruction of wild-life from the very
beginning of settlement, continued to reiterate proclamations against
wanton destruction. But without the means to reinforce these
proclamations the destruction continued. The incoming British admini-
stration sent to the Cape during the Napoleonic wars, repeated the
DEIC statutes. Lord Charles Somerset with his Regency connections
must have thought himself in fammiliar territory.
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'it is found,' one of his proclamations read, 'that many
idle and disorderly persons, of inferior classes of life,
who ought to be dependent upon their industry, waste and
misspend their time in destroying Game.'
But rather than halting the destruction of wild life the new presence
in the Cape exacerbated the commercial plundering of wild-life as the
much larger British market began to exercise its pull.
II
By the late 1830s, as the hunter's trader began to make an impres-
sion on British import statistics, a new breed of hunter-publicist had
emerged to bring the huntsman's exploits before the British reading
public. The sportsman-explorer with his books, articles and
exhibitions on hunting and wild-life in South Africa was dramatically
to influence the way in which the sub-continent was perceived in
Britain. There had been those who had provided scientific writings
describing and classifying the wild-life of the region (Barrow 1800,
Burchell 1811, Smith 1835), but it was the Victorian sportsman-au-
thors, often with Indian military experience, who brought a sense that
in the wild-life of South Africa, lay a world waiting to be
subjugated. That this subjugation could be accomplished, not by great
armies but by individuals reliant only upon courage and a well-aimed
rifle offered a world of fantasy to generations of Englishmen and
Scots and contributed to an ethos in which, several decades later,
imperial adventures flourished.
The hunter-authors proclaiming their 'prodigious slaughters' took
on for themselves the dual role of general and war-correspondent, and
cast themselves as heroes. For all that an elephant or buffalo was not
match for a well armed hunter, the 'kill' was most often portrayed as
a military engagement waged between equals. Captain William
Cornwallis Harris in his Narrative of an Expedition into Southern
Africa speaks freely of "the enemy" and of "leaders" and "detach-
ments". His book set the tone for many hunting books which followed.
Gordon Cummings having grown weary of "hunting in a country where
game was strictly preserved, and where the constant presence of keep-
ers and forresters took away half the charm of the chase," went to the
Cape "looking once more for the freedom of nature and the life of the
wild hunter," and his notions of restrictiveness in the 'Old Country'
are exactly echoed some fifty years later by Ryder Haggard'^ character
Sir Henry Curtis in conversation with Alan Quartermain. Cumming's
Five years of a Hunter's Life in the Interior of South Africa,
published in 1848, had ' an immense success' and was followed by a
display of trophies at the Great Exhibition in 1851 - activities which
brought him 'great popularity and a good deal of money. ' A
condensation of the book which appeared in 1856 went into eight edi-
tions and ten reprints over a period of fifty years. A permanent
museum, established in 1858, housed his trophies which weighed over
twenty tons. Like Harris, Cummings expressed himself in the language
of heroic and bloody war. "I waged a successful war with the hippo-
potami," he writes. A wild boar, staggering from gunshot wounds ran
off with a "comrade" staining "the stones red in his wake" and
breaking both underteeth. He describes in minute detail the death by
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suffocation of a sasserby, choking on blood, whose body began to swell
while still alive "until it literally resembled a fisherman's float."
These accounts of Africa were remarkable both for blood thirsty
detail and for the great variety of species they recorded. "The face
of the country was literally white with spring buck" wrote Harris*
"pouring like locusts from the endless plains of the interior."
Similarly Cummings on antelope:
"I beheld the ground to the northwards of my camp actually
covered with a dense living mass of springboks ... pouring
like the flood of some great river."
Even more encouraging for aspirant ivory hunters would have been
Harris on elephants.
"Here a grand and magnificent panorama was before us which
beggars all description. The whole face of the landscape
was actually covered with wild Elephants. There could not
have been fewer than three hundred within the scope of our
vision!"
A sight of hillsides covered with elephants raised not only the
spirits but the prospect of the cash register turning over. "Ah! a
good bull," Cummings exclaims, with elephant gun poised, "tusks at
least fifty pounds; four shillings and sixpence a pound; bringing me
£22,10s. Capital days work." David Livingstone, not always un-
critical of the hunters observed in some admiration that his patron,
the eminent hunter John Oswell had been known to kill four large
elephants a day. "The value of the ivory in these cases," Livingstone
wrote "would be one hundred guineas. We had reason to be proud of his
success, for the inhabitants conceived from it a very high idea of
English courage." In the message of the hunter-authors it was clear
that profit and glory could be obtained simultaneously, yet the
awareness was nonetheless present that wild animals would surely
diminish if shot at unchecked. Consequently profits would be
maintained only by limiting the activity to English hunters alone.
Other contenders for this monopoly right were most notably the Af-
rikaners of the ZAR as we shall see, and certain African chieftancies.
The conviction grew strong in the literature that Englishmen were
natural leaders in the war of subjugation. While lesser men might
find roles as guides, bearers and ancillary marksmen, only Englishmen
had the necessary virtues and skill. For Livingstone these came with
"civilisation" and increased the "beauty, courage and physical power
of the race." It also made them better elephant shots for, he
claimed, of one hunting season that while the average shot by "natives
was under one per man, from Griguas one per man, for the Boers two."
In the English officers it was "twenty each". "Civilisation" in this
way lent a hand to bravery since superior fire power allowed a British
marksman to approach within thirty yards "while others stood at a
distance of a hundred yards or even more." This daring proximity in
itself created manly virtues. "The chase" wrote Livingstone "is
eminently conducive to the formation of a brave and noble character,
and that coolness in emergencies, and active presence of mind, which
we all admire."
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H.A. Bryden believed that the qualities of the English hunter had
insured British supremacy in Southern Africa, partly by preventing
Afrikaner hegemony and partly by inducing admiration among Africans.
"The wonderful courage and energy of the early hunter" he wrote
"contributed also, in a very great degree, to the respect and
admiration in which the Englishman has been held by the black man."
But his admiration was clearly not unanimous, "I sometimes feld annoy-
ed ," Livingstone wrate "at the low estimation in which my hunting
friends were held." "Have these hunters, who come so far and work
so hard no meat at home?" they asked. "Why these men are rich and
could slaughter oxen every day of their lives." Yet they endured
hardship merely for the sake of "play". "Sport", Livingston explain-
ed, was a difficult concept for local people to understand. However,
the side benefits for Africans could, in the short run, be consider-
able.
"When they get a man to kill large quantities of game for
them, whatever he may think of himself or of his
achievements, they pride themselves in having adroitly
turned to good account the folly of the itinerant butch-
ers."
For the sportsmen-authors the distribution of game meat to porters
and local people enable them to play out a paternalism which reinforc-
ed their role as natural leaders. It also made good sense, both
because, unlike the tusks and skins, it was not saleable, and because
gifts of meat could be used to appease local chiefs in whose territory
the hunters operated. Needless to say, beneficence and not
enlightened self-interest is recorded in the literature. Their role
in ridding local people of predators was often real enough since a
lion could carry off cattle and sometimes people, but in presenting
this protective role the writers planted an image of the dependent
African, leaving their English readers with little sense, either of
the African's traditional defense structures against predators or of
their own interference with the ecology which made predators more
likely to assault human society.
Among the sportsmen-authors, images of paternalism and dominance in
their relationship to sport, extend even to the sexual-erotic where
the game - as often - is cast as female. "I was enchanted", Cummings
writes of a wounded sea-cow, "she could not escape." Through the
African experiences, authors revitalised the concept of "sports-
manship" as an aspect of that "brave and noble character" which dis-
tinguished the race. implicit within it were notions that man met
beast on equal terms. Thus to shoot an aminal defenceless at a water
hole was "a Bushmanlike practice" and to shoot at night was cowardly
as one could often wound but not kill. To kill the female of the
species, especially in the breeding season, was undersirable and to
kill, not for horns, skins or meat, but merely for the excitement of
"Jhe bag" was to be "pretty far gone in the hunting form of insanity."
In practice all of these rules were broken all of the time by
almost all of those who wrote about hunting. With their ever-increas-
ing fire power, the notion of equality in combat, analogous to the
stylised combat of currently codified public school games - was at
best a deception. True, hunting was arduous and hazardous but not
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through casualties inflicted by "the enemy". Accidents were caused by
faulty gun mechanisms, falls ^ff horses and lacerations meeted out by
thorn trees and pot-holes. The sport's essential cowardliness
perhaps goes a good way to explain the quite excessive insistence upon
the courage of the participants.
An apotheosis of their self-indulgent brutality is adequately summ-
ed up in the following description of a 'great slaughter' arranged for
Queen Victoria's son, the Duke of Edinburgh in 1860. Appropriately it
appeared in a volume entitled Sport and War.
'The plain in which we were was of vast extent - I dare
say nearly a hundred miles in circumference - and the
whole of this extent was one moving mass of game. The gaps
between the mountains on all sides of the plain were
stopped by a living line of men, and we were in the middle
of this whirling throng firing at great game at not twenty
five yard's distance as fast as we could load. The Prince
fired as fast as guns could be handed to him, for Currie
rode on one side and I on the other, and we alternately
handed guns to him as he discharged his own ...
Six hundred head of large game were shot in this day
.. . and most of the sportsmen looked more like butchers
than sportsmen, from being so covered in blood. His Royal
Highness and Currie were red up to the shoulders from
using the spear ... I generally handed my double gun to
the Prince as fast as I could load it; nevertheless I
could not resist now and then bowling over a couple of
great antelopes as they whirled past me. It was a very
exciting day and were His Royal Highness to live for a
hundred years I do not believe he could ever see such a
scene again,
 ? £ ° r t n© game in South Africa is fast
disappearing.'
III
Independent African societies played a central part in the develop-
ment of the political economy of hunting. While a detailed considera-
tion of their role must wait for a final version of this essay, the
following provisional paragraph will serve as a reminder that this
must still be undertaken.
African societies were not idle witnesses to this destruction of
wild-life and ultimately they made their own contribution to that end.
Only the various groups of San or Bushmen, though they were the most
adept of societies in the hunting of wild-life, seemed to live in some
kind of symbiosis with the beasts of the African plains. Their near
extermination took place because their clashes with settler and
African societies followed from their need to defend wild- life from
commercial hunters, pastoralists and agriculturists. Nguni and Sotho
communities, because they were cattle keepers and cultivators were
compelled to destroy not only the predators which threatened human or
animal life, but also those whose feeding habits imperilled grazing
lands and crops. Like the San, whose methods they probably absorbed,
Nguni and Sotho hunters used traps, pits, nets, bows and arrows and
spears and eventually muskets. With these methods they were not
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necessarily less effective than European hunters with their easier
access to muskets, powder and lead. As we know other preindustrial
societies greatly restricted the activities of carnivores and
scavengers as well as all but eliminating herbivours long before the
advent of the breach loading rifle. It has been convincingly argued
that the centralisation of some of these societies was assisted by the
need of chiefs to control products of the hunt to ensure its revenue
for their own purpose. As a result many animals were declared royal
game and their products became the property of chiefs. To ensure a
continuous revenue from ivory some Tswana chiefs as well as the
Ndebeli paramount introduced preservationist regimes which were the
first to be established in Southern Africa.
IV
In the interior republics, Afrikaners not surprisingly were resent-
ful of British hunters who they saw as constituting a threat to the
size of their own haul of ivory and other products of the hunt, though
it must be said that their hatred at times bordered upon the patholog-
ical. The ZAR, having passed legislation to prevent British hunting
in its territory, at one point arrested trader-hunters Chapman and
MacCabe who both had their wagons and goods seized. McCabe was taking
away 'the fat of the land that is ivory1 Andres. Pietonius told him,
and accused him of being 'an Englishman at Heart. In practice the law
proved impossible to operate. There were schisms and vested interests
within the Boer community and many Boer hunters depended upon British
traders to buy their ivory. Others could only afford to undertake
hunting expeditions 'on the half with English hunter-traders who
financed them.
Boer hunters in practice far outnumbered British, and it was with a
view to controlling Boer activities that in 1858 the Volksraad past
legislation attempting to place restraint upon the destruction of wild
life. The Volksraad legislated that needs of subsistence were to
determine the numbers of animals any burgher shot -viz. that no
burgher shot more than was required for his own .consumption, or more
than could be removed in a single wagon-load. Shooting for skins
became illegeal. Access to game as a means of subsistence was thereby
virtually enshrined in the constitution, but the measure was a dead
letter from the start. In 1866 one hunting firm exported 152,000
blesbok and wildebeest pelts. Nor did the law make specific provision
for elephant hunting where a single wagon load of ivory would have
satisfied most hunters as an adequate expedition's haul. In addition,
by the late 1850s, as hunters moved into the tsetse fly zone where
neither oxen nor horses could survive, bearers had replaced wagons as
a means of transporting goods. This move into the tsetse zone altered
the nature of elephant hunting, since it not only meant increased
tribute paid to African chiefs whose land was being encroached upon,
but rendered elephant hunting more and more the preserve of swartskuts
or black marksmen who were the white hunters' clients. These were not
a new phenomenon - similar clients had played similar hunting roles in
the Cape - but by the 1850s in the North-Eastern Transvaal elephant
hunting had effectively been abandoned to them. These former child
captives-turned-clients owed loyalty to white patrons and were
initially dependent upon them for protection and ammunition. The law
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of 1858 banned them from hunting without white overseers or from
straying beyond night fall during hunting expeditions. A white hunter
could be accompanied by no more than two swartskuts who were to be
registered with a landdrost, or magistrate. The law was in practice
never enforced, partly because local officials were themselves too
deeply involved in hunting and partly because the swartskuts'
dependent status weakened considerably as the hunting process removed
them for longer and longer periods from their masters. Swartskuts
became involved themselves in the politics of local Venda chieftancies
who possessed their own gun culture, in spite of the Sand River Treaty
between Boer and British, both of which forbad the sale of guns to
Africans. Afrikaner notables were in practice seeking not to ban the
sale of guns to Africans but to secure a monopoly against British
hunter-traders in the illegal trade. The role of African chieftancies
in hunting must be discussed elsewhere in this paper. It is enough
here to say that on effectively free trade in guns was a vital
ingredient in the political economy of hunting and in the continuing
destruction of elephants.
How phenomenal this destruction was can be seen from the figures.
Between 1848 and 1851 at least 50,0001bs of ivory was exnprted by
Boers north of the Vaal River through British colonial ports. In 1855
ivory exports were said to have weighed 200, OOOlbs and in 1856
elephants reported shot numbered 1,000. But the Volksraad, in its
impotent way recognised in elephants, a wasting asset.
Ivory Exports from Durban 1863-67
Year Value
1863 £40,736
1864 £26,254
1865 £19,154
1866 £6,524
1867 £5,908
Although the decline in ivory sales coincided with a decline in
Boer political power in the Zoutpansberg, there is no doubt that
elephants had become harder to come by.
In a further effort to slow the reduction in wild-life the Volks-
raad in 1870 appointed jagopsieners or game wardens to attempt law
enforcement but, as Hatting observed, these were either wolves set to
mind sheep ( ' in die rol van wolf wat moes skape oppas • ) or wholly
ineffective officers who soon resigned the task as socially unaccept-
able.
In the sixties an alternative attempt to arrest the decline of game
emerged as landowners issued statements in the Staats courant to the
effect that they would no longer permit hunting on their lands. While
previously the right of the poor to hunt for food had gone
unchallenged, the process of reconstituting wild-life as private
property had now begun.
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Year
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
*13No. of notices
9
1
6
20
20
24
10
28
22
*
Notices were for more than one farm
The logical corollary to this substantial change in social philoso-
phy was that the poor ought to find alternative forms of subsistence.
In 1873 the Volkstem, the ZAR's leading newspaper, drew the conclu-
sion that hunting was not only an assault upon a wasting resource but
a disincentive to productive labour. Just then when the new mining
settlements were willing to pay famine prices for food the republic
could not supply it because its members were engaged in a fruitless
chase. Furthermore hunting, the paper claimed, lured men from
productive work into a liking for indolence. The country, it stated,
would make economic progress only when the game had disappeared. In a
preservationist article this was a startling conclusion. The paper
ended by calling for heavy fines both to prevent wholesale destruction
and to induce men, as the paper expressed it, to work for a living.
Attempts were made over the next twenty years to implement pro-
posals to meet these issues mainly by creating a closed period during
which animals could breed and rear young beyond infancy. Legislation
was invariably met by claims that the poor would lose their subsist-
ence and that property owners would lose their rights to use their own
land as they wished. It was claimed in addition that since the state
had insufficient force to curb African hunting, any legislation was
not worth the bother. A licensing system to restrict the numbers of
animals shot was perceived as disadvantaging the poor who could not
pay the licence fee. The preservationist lobby, however - by now much
the more influencial - defeated these objections by pointing out that
without legislation there would soon be no animals left for the poor
to shoot at all. ' The time was past' President Kruger announced,
'when a man could spend three days on the trail of a Steenbuck instead
of earning £3 in this time1. Conservation had come tc be perceived as
a means to economic growth, though not surprisingly, the only
unanimously popular legislation amongst burghers was that of 1891
which forbad Africans to own hunting dogs and - until the outbreak of
the South African War in 1899 - all conservation legislation was in
actuality beyond the capacity of the ZAR to enforce.
Yet, inspite of legsilative impotence, the conservationist pro-
gramme was more and more widely accepted and by 1891 the first of the
Transvaal wild-life protection societies was formed in Pretoria and
Johannesburg. By 1898 legislation had been passed to create a game
reserve in the Sabi River region of the eastern Transvaal which
bordered on the Portuguese colocy of Mozambique and where wild life
still survived in significant numbers. There were few white settlers,
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since both climate and malaria inhibited permanent residence, though
it had been established as an area where trek boers took cattle for
"winter grazing". As one landdrost remarked, however, this was a
thinly disguised name for a hunting party. Relatively few Africans
lived in the region beyond three thousand partly because of the reign
of terror conducted by the Lydenburg Native Commissioner, Abel
Erasmus, who sought to control local game for his own and his
supporters use, but there was nonetheless black residents, including
Swazis who used the area for seasonal grazing, who would have been
dispossessed by the scheme, being too weak to resist in the event of
its implementation. There were also absentee white landowners -
mainly corporate landowners - who had acquired land in the area for
speculative purposes. Minerals had not yet been uncovered here,
though coal and diamonds were thought to exist, and their sole source
of income from the land meanwhile was in rent from African tenant
farmers. In the event interest groups had little need for opposition
since in the two years left to the republic the scheme was never
implemented. The War in 1899 was paradoxical in its effect with
regard to wild-life. It both hastened the destruction of game in the
designated reserve area and provided the frfmework for administrative
coercion in which conservationist policy could ultimately flourish.
To the preservationists who finally formulated effective government
policy, extermination had gone too far for a simple management
strategy towards game as a commodity to be possible. Nor could it be
managed to provide regulated subsistence and sport. Commercial hunting
was no longer viable and game took on instead a value beyond it
usefulness as a commodity. Its value, like that of precious stones,
was perceived as existing beyond its utility. To the harbingers of a
new industrial society its validity as a source of food for poor white
and poor black had disappeared.
V
The destruction of the Boer republic saw the creation of the Trans-
vaal colonial state and with it an effective wild-life preservation
policy. The state of the late ZAR had used its power to control Af-
ricans in many areas of economic and social life but it took Milner's
reconstruction regime to use it systematically to restrict hunting. It
was no doubt for this reason that the Transvaal government chose to
place the administration of the Sabi game reserve under the aegis of
the Department of Native Affairs but we can hardly avoid thinking that
this classification was itself revealing. Milner's officials also
used their resources to ensure that both the Afrikaner poor and the
influencial corporate landowners respected the preservationist measur-
es which they introduced. The new Transvaal government worked closely
with the preservationist pressure group, the Transvaal Game Preserva-
tion Association (TGPA) which provided it with endless proposals for
legislation. To a regime over-concerned to ensure labour for the
goldmines the claim that putting an end to poaching would increase
that labour supply was extremely gratifying. This coincided with the
fostering of 'sportsmanship• which, by the observation of its rules,
could be seen ' to improve the national character. ' Moreover by
safeguarding the survival of the veld and the bush with their wild
life inhabitants, preservationists secured the teaching of 'resource-
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fulness', 'self-reliance', 'unselfishness', 'endurance', 'vigilance'
and the 'proper understanding of our fellow man'. Unfortunately this
'understanding of our fellow man' did not extend to poachers, white or
black, and such was the preservationist hostility to them that it was
often indistinguishable from hysteria. Determined as they were to
manage game as a method of ensuring sport for themselves, they
conjured up a nightmare world of poachers - black and white - with
illegal rifles, traps, pits, snares and dogs. Like a hunter's version
of black peril, their exaggerated fears may have caused some officials
of the Transvaal government to consider aspects of the preservationist
programme. Having accepted the bulk of this they began to doubt its
wisdom. Anti-poaching legislation, having denied Africans game as
apart of their diet and having compelled them to grow their food
supply, now threatened this same food supply by preventing Africans
from inhibiting wild animals roaming free over their cultivated lands.
This was almost certainly an unintended consequence of preservation-
ist legislation - it cannot be argued that social policy included the
creation of a fully-fledged proletariat - and must have contributed to
the famine associated with the drought of 1911-12. At the same time
there was some African resistance to the new scheme of things and
nowhere was this resistance as spectacular as in the Sabi game
reserve.
The incoming British administration showed its concern for the
preservation of wild life even before the end of the South African
War- It went so far as to appoint a game ranger for the Sabi reserve
before the war was over and before Boer forces had been dislodged from
the entire reserve. Recognising that this was premature the ranger
was dismissed and the control of the region was placed in the hands of
a locally raised cavalry unit known as Steinaecker's Horse. Being
mounted and armed in an area still rich in wild life, the cavalrymen
inevitably took advantage of their position to shoot buck for
themselves but they were also employed in a preservationist role both
before and after peace was declared. Using martial law, they were
soon 'arresting and punishing all found killing game in the Reserve'
James Stevenson-Hamilton, who, six weeks after the war ended, was
appointed warden of the Sabi Game Reserve in July 1902, thought that
Steinacker's Horse had provided a 'wholesome restraint' for Africans-
hunting in the Lower Sabi area but he recognised that once the
military had been withdrawn hunting would soon start again. It was
therefore 'absolutely imperative to remove all Natives and remove them
speedily'. This widely held opinion was early on given support by
the Director of the Pretoria Museum and Zoological Gardens who in
Frebruary 1901 when the war was far from being over, wrote to the
Colonial Secretary of the new British administration, urging that 'All
kaffirs should be immediately moved out of the area to be proclaimed
except personal servants of the officials and native police'.
Similarly the magistrate at Barberton spelt out the reasons why he
thought Africans should be expelled from the area which was to contain
the game reserve.
1
 There is, ' he wrote, ' a large native population in the
reserve which is, from time to time increased by imm-
igrants from Portuguese territory. The presence of the
Natives drives the game further north and outside the
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Reserve. The Natives by traps, with arms and dogs, slaugh-
ter large numbers of game. If the Native population is
allowed to remain in the Reserve it is almost idle to talk
of preserving the game. I am therefore of the opinion
that all Natives should be removed from the Reserve.1
As he saw it, therefore, one of the first tasks of the warden of
the new game reserve was to attempt to control the African popoulation
within his domain and where possible to expel it from within its
borders. He claimed that in August 1902 there were between two and
three thousand men, women and children living within the reserve who
had, as he put it, all 'left' a year later. We can only guess at the
circumstances of this departure but in November 1903 the Secretary of
the Transvaal Consolidated Land and Exploration Company wrote to
complain that on fifteen of their landholdings 'we have been informed
that natives have been driven from our farms in the Eastern Transvaal
and that their huts have been burned'.
There was never denial that this had taken place
 t only the claim
that, since there were no survey beacons, the Company could not prove
that what by common consent had happened, had in fact taken place on
their land. What had been done had been undertaken ' in connection
with the preservations of game1, for which Stevenson-Hamilton was said
to have had their 'authority1. To this the Company secretary replied:
'his authority is to preserve game and he has never been authorised
... to interfere with the natives living on our farms and so deprive
us of revenue from our properties.• There were other land company
farms where the game warden had to tread warily for a considerable
time. As late as 1904 there were still farms on the western and
northern areas of the reserve where trapping, snaring and hunting were
still being systematically undertaken by resident African tenants on
Company land. In an attempt to bring this now illegal hunting to an
end Stevenson-Hamilton established a police post in a position central
to where the newly created poachers were operating. Six weeks after
the establishment of the post the local agent of the Transvaal Estates
and Development Company wrote to Stevenson-Hamilton reporting that his
tenants had complained about the police post in their midst.
Stevenson-Hamilton defended the location of the post - it was an
important river crossing - and the alnd agent conceded that the post
should remain on Company land. He insisted, however, that there should
be an assurance that there would be no prosecutions for the trappings
or snaring of guinea fowl. Stevenson-Hamilton could give no such
assurance.
• The answer of the agent to this• the Warden wrote ' was
that the natives had informed him that unless the police
were immediately removed and were forbidden to interfere
with the natives in the district, they would give notice
to quit the farms. He went on to say that as this would
mean a very serious pecuniary loss to him he must request
me to forthwith remove the police and place them some
distance of where there are fewer natives.'
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The same warden felt it necessary to obey the landowners' injuntion
and the local officials were asked to withdraw the police station to
the land of a more friendly property owner four miles away. Steven-
son-Hamilton found this restriction galling since it was likely to
lead to resentment from surrounding landowners who would claim that
their self-denial was bei#g exploited by 'a lot of lazy natives who
will not go out to work.'
It had become a common place that hunting was the activity of 'lazy
natives.1 Nor was it only 'natives' who would rather hunt than accept
paid labour. 'Poor Boers' the Transvaal Game Preservation Society
complained 'trekked about the country and practically lived on what
they could get with the gun. ' If poaching could be restricted by
judicious expenditure on game keepers then not only would considerable
income be made from sportsmen who would pay to shoot on landowners
farms, but a wider benefit would be obtained. 'A large number of
Natives and others who are now subsisting on this game would compelled
to work in a legitimate way for their livelihood.'
From the outset of this tenure as warden Stevenson-Hamilton was
determined to rid himself of poor whites living on the fringes of the
game reserve as he was of poor blacks living within it. Of one group
of White River Boer squatters, he wrote that they 'are of so low a
type that other Boers frequently allude to them as wild people. ' He
was harassed by them as people living 'almost wholly by killing game'
and furthermore as people whose horses made them sufficiently mobile
to make prosecution cirtually impossible. He proposed moving one
group of twenty to thirty families out of the district. Unlike
African squatters, however, he found that he could not get the White
River squatters moved simply because they posed a threat to game.
1
 Boer hunters' continued to menace him when in September 1904 he
undertook an exploratory j ourney north of the Sabi River. In one
forty mile stretch he wrote:
' I actually saw no game whatever. The reason being' he
continued, 'that during the War and before it ths was one
of the favourite Boer hunting grounds, while this winter
two separate parties of Boers have .shot along the river;
one party twice and the other once.'
Along the Singwitsi River he reported seeing small numbers of
kudos, reedbuck, impala, waterbuck and ostriches, and observed that
these were being hunted systematically by Africans using bows ans
poisoned arrows. Nevertheless, he felt it necessary to assert that
the damage done by Africans in a year would not equal that done by a
' few Boers in a week. ' The last elephants to enter the region -
eight in all - were 'shot by Boers' on the Letaba River; the last of
the Transvaal eland, he said, were ' exterminated by the Boers during
the War' and a similar fate had befallen the last rhinoceros.
Stevenson-Hamilton proposed that a game ranger with police powers be
placed in the region to enforce the game laws.
'I would, however emphasize the fact that Game Ordinances
of all kinds are so much waste paper to the Boer hunters;
one out of sight of a policeman, they have no sporting
instincts and no sense of nonour as a rule, and know well
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how hard it is to secure a conviction against them for
what they do far away from civilization.'
Or, as he wrote on another occasion, when presented with one of the
interminable applications to go treasure hunting for the 'Kruger
millions'..Q 'this man is a bywoner and could not be trusted in the
Reserve'.
The Transvaal Land Owners' Association (TLOA) a mainly Anglophone
corporate organisation, was, if possible, even more hostile to Afri-
kaner poachers. In 1905 with Stevenson-Hamilton's dishonourable
Boers' in mind, the T.L.0.A. proposed that its members attempt to
control white squatters living on their lands, mostly without permis-
sion and without paying rent. Many of these squatters, or bywoners,
the Association complained
'make no attempt to live by farming but merely make the
farm their Headquarters from which they organise shooting
expeditions. They live by poaching and stealing their
owner's wood. One of these men, a tenant on a member's
farm lately, sold 2400lbs of bilton (dried venison) at
Nylstroom.'
The Association proposed, therefore, to draw up an inventory of by-
woners living on member's land holdings. Confidential enquiries were
to be made into their activities and where it was discovered that a
man supported himself and his family by poaching he was to be evicted.
His name was to be placed on a 'black list1 and other members of the
Association would then deny him access to their land.
More often than not, however, both officials and the various pres-
sure groups to which they resonded concerned themselves with African
poaching, not least because White sportsmen complained that African
hunting was denying them the kill which was rightfully theirs. The
Secretary for Native Affairs seemed to have been sensitive to such
charges. Hence the concern, for example, to take note of a complaint
made by a ' sportsman' named Duncan Stewart who had had his hunting
frustrated by the 'wholesale trapping and slaughter1 of small game by
'indolent and lazy natives who are loafing their time here doing
nothing else.' Stewart's 'surprise' and 'chagrin' was the result of
hishaving had to pay £3 for a hunting licence, only to find that
unlicenced Africans were using traps and dogs to bring down guinea
fowl and buck. Stewart thought this unfair. Without a licence he was
liable to a fine, but at that same time hunting was being undertaken
by 'thousands of lazy natives who appear to do nothing else and I
consider it very unjust and against all reason.' Stewart's
indignation may have been exacerbated by the response he got from
Africans when he tried to stop them hunting. 'On expostulating with
the natives against trapping' he wrote 'I was only laughed at and told
that they wanted "Injama" (meat) and intended getting it.•
Stewart took it upon himself to destroy every trap that he came
across but, as he reported, his efforts came to nothing 'for the
niggers simply substitute other contrivances at short notice.' Police
patrols, he claimed had not visited the district for almost four
months and it was little wonder that 'wholesome poaching and destruc-
tion of game would be carried on with impunity.'
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lI think' he wrote 'that the Game Protection society
should take the matter in hand. I believe its purpose is
to protect game throughout the country and there is
adequate scope here to enforce their regulations. The game
is so wild owing to being chased and hunted by natives
that any sportsman coming down here foe a few weeks
shooting would be very much disappointed.'
Stewart's complaint about ineffectiveness of the South African
Constabulary and the insinuation that not enough was being done to
protect wild life caught the administration on the hop. It did not
matter that his protectionism was geared to maintaining his hunting
stocks rather than saving wild-life. His letter passed from depart-
ment to department and local police were called on to justify their
supposed slackness. The police defended themselves by assertting that
Stewart was insufficiently precise for them to know where the poaching
had occurred, that they were, in any event, not responsible for
detecting 'undue' hunting, and in any event there were frequent police
patrols in the Klein Letaba District. Nevertheless, a circular was
sent to the Constabulary asking them to pay special attention to
illegal hunting. Within a few days an Afrikaner called Vermeulen was
arrested for having shot thirty six buck in two days with the
intention of selling the meat on the Pretoria market, but otherwise
not much seems to have resulted from a great deal of bureaucratic
exchange.
If officials in Pretoria and Johannesburg seem to have been anxious
to placate the sportsmen of the T.G.P.A. then many of the local
administrators in the Native Affairs Department were less sympathetic
to them. Thus Charles Wheelwright in the Northern division of the
Transvaal took a completely different view of Stewart's complaints.
His officials had few, if any, police to spare for wild life protec-
tion but in any event traps set for guinea fowl were justified because
the birds threatened the crops of local people. These bir^ds he wrote
were a 'pest' as they ran about in 'countless' numbers. When the
warden of the reserve sounded a note of scepticism about Wheelwright's
opinion, the latter resonded with some irritation.
'I would suggest as an experiment, that Major Hamilton
might attempt to grow grain crops of any kind, along the
main road and be prohibited from destroying guinea fowl.
A year later Wheelwright returned to the theme.
11 have seen numerous instances in this District where
entire fields have been cleared away of all seeds planted
standing crops des4+royed by Guinea Fowl, Partridge, Stein
Buck, Duiker etc.'
Stevenson-Hamilton saw no problem in securing crops. All that had
to be done was for 'the boys and idle young men who at present do
nothing but hunt, and load in the-kraals ... to donate some of their
spare time guarding their crops.• But many administrators in the
districts outside of the game reserve - and others besides administra-
tors - came to hold Wheelwright's opinion that protectionist measures
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were becoming so effective that Africans were losing their crops and
in some instances were threatened with starvation. They did no deny
that Africans were responsible for the destruction of some animals,
but considered it improbable that these Africans caused the devasta-
tion for which they were often credited. There were variations from
district to district and some officials were rady to agree with the
protectionists on the scale of poaching taking place. But the overall
picture which emerged was far more complex than either the T.G.P.A. or
the T.L.0.A. would allow. Thus the Native Commissioner in the
Rustenburg district urged caution when in 1903 he wrote,
'Very little game is destroyed by natives in this District
by means of snares, traps etc. , and it is only done for
the protection of crops which ^re in places greatly
damaged by both bucks and birds.'
A year later there was a note of desparation in that Native Com-
missioner's comments.
11 should like' he wrote ' to let the Game Protection
Association know that we have during the last twelve
months, had occasion to realise that the over-protection
of game in some parts has resulted in the most dangerous
consequences to the natives who have, in many cases, lost
their crops ... it would', he continued, 'be a monstrous
thing and severe on persons being as a rule unarmed, who
were not allowed to protect themselves by any methods, and
who would otherwise be deprived of their means of living.'
If we need any more confirmation that conservationist legislation
was threatening the livelihood of farmers - settler as well as
Africans - then the testimony of E. Steinaecker, whose military unit
had employed martial law to stop hunting in 1901 and 1902 may be of
some value. Now, in 1907, he found that because trapping had been
made illegal there had been an unchecked increase of bush pig, duiker
and hare as well as packs of wild dogs. This resurgence of these wild
animals meant, according to Steinacker, that farming in the low
country was becoming almost impossible. That year drought had led to
the failure of the maize and sorghum planted by Africans and although
they had planted a line of secondary crops, sweet potatoes and monkey
nuts, these were being consumed by the hares as they grew.
Steinacker's great fear was that the authorities would allow Africans
to arm themselves to prevent famine. He proposed instead, therefore,
that Africans living on his lands be permitted to set traps on their
fields. At the same time, they could, he said, set jfrem on his own
fields since the was faced with the same difficulty. It is verly
likely that in the long drought between 1907 and 1911 preservationist
measures gereatly affected the growth of African crops. As one
official of the Native Affairs Department observed in February 1911,
'The (Game Preservation) Association is, I am aware,
active in preserving game and solicitous about locations.
To judge by the complaints regarding destruction of crops
by game I should think,that game in some locations thrives
better than natives.'
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Protectionist measures were not, of course, equally effective in
every region and district. The native Commissionr in the Central
Division of the transvaal accepted that 'in the more isolated
locations, much game is destroyed by native dogs and pitfalls*. The
resident magistrate in Standerton reported that two or three cases had
been brought before him the previous year, and the magistrate at
Ermelo told of a similar number. From the far more isolated Waterberg
district, the Resident magistrate claimed that very great destruction
of wild life was taking place.
'lam continually receiving information, he wrote, 'that
the destruction of game by natives takes place on an
extensive scale especially in the Utard Koedoesrand. It
has also been brought to my notice that natives from
Khama's Territory cross the Crocodile River into Tul, kill
large numbers of game and do a good trade in skins ...'
But there were other claims that Africans were responsible for the
widespread killing of game which could either be shown to be false,
much exaggerated or to have been the work of white hunters. A case in
point was in the Rustenburg district, where the T.L.O.A. claimed that
Africans were responsible both for the commerical shooting of
ostriches for feathers and the stealing of ostrich eggs from nests.
Charles Griffith, the magistrate in the district could only discover
one case of a man being illegally in possession of ostrich eggs. As
for feathers, one or two ostriches had been shot the previous year and
their feathers had been sold to a local trader by aruAfrican, but the
killing had been done by white 'shooting parties.' In general he
was, however,
'convinced that very little game is destroyed by Natives
and in support of this it is the experience of almost
every sportsman here that the best shooting in the Divi-
sion is to be got on ground owned and occupied by Natives
and on adjoining unoccupied European farms.'
The claim that wild life was in serious danger of being shot out in
the Rustenberg district was valid but it was not the Africans of the
district who were responsible for this. A letter written to the
Volkstem in September 1905 pointed to those who were. Written by a
local correspondent called Van Noorden, he complained that in the
previous hunting season 3,000 buck of several varieties were killed in
the district by Johannesburg 'shooting parties'. Each one of these,
he wrote had gone away with eighty or ninety carcasses. The 3,000
animals did not include animals killed by landowners on their own
farms. If there was another year like that, Van Noorden wrote, there
would be no buck left in the district. These figures were disputed by
Griffiths who thought 3,000 too high but he accepted that shooting
parties never came away with less than fifty buck.
These parties, Van Noorden reported, came to the district with
spring wagons and mules and were 'well equipped in every way for the
slaughter.' They trekked on to Bushveld farms without permission of
absentee owners, ignoring notices that shooting was not permitted.
Where the land-owner had African tenants or squatters these were given
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written authority to tell 'sportsmen' that they were denied shooting
rights. What, Van Noorden asked, did these 'self-styled Johannesburg
gentlemen' do when confronted with such an injunction?
'The nigger boy did his duty and showed them the notices,
with that result that after he had received a thrashing he
was chased away.'
By the time the land-owner was told of the incident the poachers were
a long way away and it was impossible to trace them.
•It is common amongst us' Van Noorden wrote, 'to always
put the blame on Kaffirs where there are lots of dogs as
being the cause of all extermination. Notwithstanding
that the blacks do a lot of harm to the game, still they
are like angels compared to the devils from Johannesburg.
The Kaffir dogs may catch a buck here or there but the
loss is small in comparison with the unsportsmanlike
shooting of game caused by these parties.'
A similar refutation came from within the remote Sibasa district
within the Zoutpansberg region. This was a large district which had a
northern border extending for seventy miles along the South African-
Southern Rhodesian frontier and a western border, 120 miles long,
running along the line separating South Africa from Mozambique.
According to the sub-Native Commissioner C.N. Manning, in areas where
there was no white settlement at all, but which were inhabited by
large numbers of African communities, wild life abounded. On the
other hand in areas occupied or frequented by Europeans, wild-life was
'extremely scarce1. 'One seems justified1 Manning wrote, 'in stating
that Europeans generally and especially shooting parties are respons-
ible for this to a great extent. ' There was an additional hazard for
many of the antelope and other species which the state was now
attempting to save from extinction. Because Africans had had to
surrender their arms, and because a very lage area had been cleared of
hunting dogs, protected species were being threatened by lions,
leopards and other carnivores. Manning also denied that hunting
drives were being organised by chiefs. To be effective these had to
be large enough to attract public attention and it was impossible to
have 'clandestine drives. Rather than being in the fore-front of
poaching Manning claimed that chiefs had prevented the destruction of
protected animals such as hippopotomi even though these often
destroyed crops. Manning alsow showed that the traps which were so
widely complained about were built to protect homesteads and crops
from assaults by animals officially classified as vermin. Manning
acknowledged that guinea fowl and partridge were caught by such traps,
but from observations he had made, the traps were far more effective
against wild cats, cane rats, lynxes, jackals and even leopards.
1
 The construction of these traps,' Manning wrote, ' with
small openings and often closed up at one end, is hardly
such as would tempt a small buck - not to mention larger
species - to enter same voluntarily, when the fences can
easily be jumped over, whereas vermin will generally creep
through a hole.'
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Manning claimed that there were a number of places along the lower
Levubu river where reed-buck, duiker, steenbuck and large numbers of
guinea fowl were to be found within a few hundred yards of African
homesteads. These had often provided the "bag" for European 'shooting
parties'. On the other hand if local people were to kill 'what often
constitutes even a day's bag by European shooting parties' the word
would quickly get round and would ensure their prosecution. Manning's
purpose in all this was not to suggest that Africans were not
responsible for the destruction of any wild life but rather to show
that the allegations of wholesale slaughter were much exaggerated as
any careful and competent observer would have been able to prove.
'To state1 he wrote, 'that no killing of game by Natives
takes place or that they would not destroy game if given
their old opportunities (emphasis in original) for doing
so, would obviously be absurd but under present circum-
stances it is submitted that a number of statements made
prophesying extinction of game by natives in the near
future are unfounded and could be easily refuted.1
VI
In 1898, to prevent Africans from hunting in the Sabi region where
he was Native Commissioner, Abel Erasmus had left officials of the
Boer state in rounding up people and forcing them out of the dis-
trict. Erasmus was not, of course, a protectionist, but was intent on
having a monopoly of wild life in the eastern reaches of the ZAR.
Those evicted were either forced to move onto white farms, or evaded
Erasmus's rule by moving across the border into Portuguese-ruled
territory. Settler rule was less pervasive there and an unknown number
of refugees established new homesteads close to the border with the
Transvaal. From there they joined forces with kinsmen and others and
continued to hunt for skins and food on both sides of the Trans-
vaal-Mozambique border. During the war Erasmus's rule collapsed and
hunting went on - for a while at least - without restriction.
Steinaecker's Horse placed some restraint on African hunters but, with
the lifting of martial law, poachers were said to be entering the new
game reserve both from the Transvaal and from Mozambique. Stevenson-
Hamilton was nevertheless able to report that two separate charges of
poaching had been successfully brought before local courts; in one
case for the killing of a zebra and in another for the shooting of an
impala and' a warthog. The convicted persons were said to have been
'severely punished'. Possibly more important was the conviction of a
Portuguese 'boy' arrested while hunting in the reserve with a Martini
Henry rifle. The man was given an 'exemplary sentence' which, somewhat
optimistically, Stevenson-Hamilton claimed had had the 'effect of
putting a complete stop to depredations'. In fact, the next twenty
five years were to see ever-increased raiding from the Portuguese
colony as more and more poachers crossed into the South African game
reserve in search of buck and other animals.
Poachers coming across the border from Mozambique - the overwhelm-
ing majority of whom were Africans - were very often armed with ri-
fles. There was considerable illegal trade in modern rifles and ammu-
nition in the Portuguese colony and, in addition, a large number of
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muzzle loaders were still in service the first decade of the twentieth
century. Many rifles were purchased or stolen at the end of the South
African War while others had been brought from white hunters before
the War. Africans living in the Sabi River area were armed at the end
of the war but had been forced to surrender their arms in 1902.
Ammunition for breach loading rifles could be bought illegally on the
west bank of the Sabi from local traders who attempted to palm off old
stocks on their customers, but knowledgeable shots could always ensure
that they obtained new cartridges in packets of ten at ten shillings a
time. One of these treaders, a European, known to his customers as
Laise (Rice?),1 reported that he had acquired his stocks of ammunition
from a storekeeper on the outskirts of Lourenco Marques (Maputo) in
the district of 'Mashaba' where he paid £1 for six packets. African
traders also purchased ammunition in Mashaba and, travelling in twos
and threes, they peddled their wares from sacks. Pedlars were to be
found traversing the Wanitzi River and its tributary in districts
adjacent to the Lebombo Hills which ran parallel to the South African
border.
By contrast the black rangers and police recruited to the game
reserve staff were restricted to assegais and sticks - restriction
which followed from settler and colonial mistrust of African rangers
and from anxiety about arming Africans in general. At best African
rangers were seen as ex-poachers who would probably use arms to make
their own kill for meat and skins. At worst the fear was that African
rangers would invovle the state in their own quarrels with poachers
who were, as often as not, their kinsmen and ex-neighbours and with
whom they had shared the region before its designation as a game
reserve. When the TGPA proposed the introduction of African rangers
for districts outside the game reserve, the Commissioner for Native
Affairs, Geoffrey Lagden, revealed how little he and his officials
trusted the men now serving them in the Sabi district in the following
comment. 'Personal friends of the detectives', Lagden wrote, ' or
those prepared to pay him a fee or hand him a proportion of the meat
would go free, while innocent persons would be accused in order that
he might earn his information fee and keep up a reputation for
alterness1. As for the rangers in the game reserve, while Lagden had
'no doubt1 that they did 'most excellent work1, this was because there
was constant 'white direction and supervision'. Stevenson-Hamilton
might write of one ranger, a man whom he called Jase, that he was 'a
noted poacher' whom he had engaged 'according to the principle of
setting a thief to catch a thief and that he was now 'invested with
the halo of respectibility which surrounds government employ, 'but it
was Lagden's view of African game rangers which was to prevail. 'Give
even the best of them a free hand allow him to get away from control
and he will not improbably do a great deal more harm than good. ' The
fact, as we shall see, that it was not only possible for poachers to
become rangers, but for ex-rangers to become poachers, would have left
Lagden feeling justified in his views.
The 'exemplary sentence1 of 1903 from which Stevenson-Hamilton had
derived so much hope, was followed within two years by the first
murder of an African ranger carrying out his patrol duties within the
reserve on the Lebomba Hills. The culprits were said to have been
'Portuguese natives' and the Transvaal Government began the first of
its many attempts to persuade the colonial Government of Mozambique to
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allow the extradition of these accused persons. The ineffectual
Mozambique authorities blocked the extradition and the morale of
African rangers slumped, while the confidence of poachers was said to
have been considerably raised. Already by 1906 it was said that
poachers had established a pattern for their raids into the Transvaal.
Knowing full well that unarmed rangers could not effectively
challenge their activities it became far more feasible for poachers to
open fire on rangers, than for rangers to challenge poachers. Even
when the police-cum-rangers pursued poachers, the offenders could
recross the border into Mozambique, summon assistance in large numbers
and return to drive them away. This significant advantage among
poachers was already established in 1912 when poaching appears to have
reached such proportions that it threatened the preservationist
objective.
Increasing poacher activity - aggravated both by the serious
drought of 1912 and by the decrease in wild-life on the Portuguese
side of the border - led to a series of incidents which caused Steven-
son-Hamilton to fear that the constant flouting of authority in this
area would pose a serious challenge to colonial rule on both sides of
the border. In November an African constable, patrolling the reserve
along the foot of the Lembombo Hills, encountered a poaching party
bearing the carcasses of a sable antelope, two warthogs and a
reedbuck, the last of which had already been carved for the pot. The
men were on a path leading from the game reserve direct to their
village within the Portuguese colony and on being discovered fired a
shot at the ranger who took cover behind a tree, and began to blow a
whistle in order to convey an impression of calling up reinforcements.
Shortly thereafter a 'very well-known native poacher1 named Sigodo was
captured by police, after which his relatives and 'others usually
implicated in the poaching business1, let it be known that they would
henceforth shoot at unarmed policemen on sight. Within a week a
patrolling constable had been fired upon by an assailant who gave no
warning and, in December, three African rangers - their names
doubtless assigned to them in the manner of settler tradition - were
fired upon after a skirmish with 'four natives sitting down, while a
fifth was in the act of stalking a herd of wildebeest.' Constables
Breakfast and Mafuta and Corporal Mpampuni, having pursued the men who
were all armed with rifles, succeeded in apprehending an old man among
them named Myambi. After this the poachers fired two shots from a
distance of seventy yards.
'The first bullet struck the ground just at my feet,'
Corporal Mpampuni reported, 'and the second one passed so
close to Native Constable Breakfast's ear that he thought
he was hit and fell to the ground. Thinking he was shot,
I let the prisoner we were holding go.'
Constable Breakfast who knew one of the poachers called out, 'Why do
you want to kill me?' 'Because we want to kill meat,' came the answer,
•and because you have caught my brother Sigoda.'
Within days another group of poachers were encountered at Hlowa
Spruit to the west of the Lebomobo Hills. Both sergeants recognised
one of the men - Sergeant Jafuta because they had grown up together in
neighbouring homesteads on the same farm. The poachers, one Matafene,
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had previously been forced out of the low veld with his entire family
by Abel Erasmus and had later moved into Portuguese territory. Now
with his wife and dependents dead, he was engaged in poaching
expeditions and on this occasion armed with a Martini-Henry rifle,
Matafene succeeded in_securing the release a prisoner whom the African
policeman had in tow.
Matafene was one of nine living near Matukunhana who were said by
the game reserve authorities to have been involved in recent affrays.
They were all armed with rifles. Another two men from near the
railway town of Ressano Garcia were also known to have been involved
in recent skirmishes and two further groups of five 'well known'
poaches including the ammunition seller Laise were said to live
between the Sabi and Manzemtoto Rivers close to the Transvaal
border. Further groups of armed poachers, among them certain local
chiefs, were known by the game reserve authorities to be living in the
area to the north of the Manzemtoto River. One of the chiefs involved
had recently attempted to secure the release of several relatives held
on poaching charges by offering bribes to the arresting constables and
another had been found in possession of a double barrelled gun.
It is little wonder then that Stevenson-Hamilton came to be deeply
disturbed by the situation. As poaching increased, so he felt driven
to respond, with the object of curtailing illegal hunting. But the
poachers in their turn responded with ever-increasing violence.
'Our men cannot be expected to go on any longer on the
present lines', he wrote, 'and it must either happen that
all supervision will come to an end or that our police
will be driven to defend themselves with the result that
considerable loss of life may occur followed by possibly
serious native unrest especially in Portuguese Territory,
but also in the Transvaal, since the natives on both sides
of the border are closely and intimately connected by
blood and marriage ties. In any case it seems desirable
to avoid the long official enquiries and expenses which
any serious fray, followed by further reprisals, and
possible agitation against Europeans might lead to.
It is a serious danger to all Europeans living in the
Low Country, but especially to the Portuguese themselves
that such a large number of natives should not only be
well provided with firearms and ammunition, but should
also have so much opportunity of learning to use them to
advantage.
In the event of any general or partial native rising in
the border districts, it would, I am confident, be quickly
discovered that the Portuguese natives are not only
adequately equipped but are many of them extremely capable
marksmen. Native trouble of a serious nature has before
now arisen from causes quite as slight as the present.'
The years immediately following Stevenson-Hamilton's prognostica-
tions in 1912 were, as it turned out, no more than average years for
violent activity among poachers. Poaching continued unabated on the
Mozambique-Transvaal border throughout the Great War, and while we
cannot for want of space linger here on the events of the next decade,
*-*
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it is worth briefly noting and illustrating an additional dimension
which was accruing to the conflict. Enmity between poacher and ranger
had reached a pitch where original objectives were forgotten in an
increasingly desperate vendetta waged by poachers against African
rangers who, in their turn, were forced into a defence of an
institution increasingly valued by white South Africa but which gave
them little in return, not even trust. After one more poaching foray,
Stevenson-Hamilton wrote, in November 1928, that it was becoming
'increasingly difficult to get our men to patrol the
Portuguese border which, therefore becomes more and more
free to the poachers. I accordingly most earnestly re-
quest that the strongest representations be made in the
proper quarter ^with a view to putting a stop to the pres-
ent terrorism.'
A last episode in 1927 must suffice to give an impression of the
ultimate and intense conflict which evolved during the poacher•s
attempts to secure their own subsistence. As a prelude to the episode
it ought to be said that the drought of 1927 had intensified
antipathies and had forced Mozambiquan Africans to bring cattle over
the border into the reserve for drinking water. East Coast Fever
regulations, however, had led to many of these animals being impounded
by rangers and then - on instruction from the Department of Agri-
culture - systematically destroyed. Rumour soon spread that this
destruction had been followed by a clash between rangers and 'a band
of Portuguese native poachers', two of whom were believed to have been
killed. The rumour, whether based on fact or not - and the
authorities found it impossible to establish - had the effect of
deepening ill-feeling which manifested itself in the following epi-
sode.
On November 21st a group of five African rangers, among them Con-
stable Cement Mathlabi, set out to patrol the eastern boundary of the
reserve. On the third day while on the farm, Tivoli, four miles from
the Portuguese border, they encountered three African poachers with
the carcasses of two waterbuck and a steenbuck. The rangers managed
to arrest one of the men known to them as Penny and, having moved on,
made camp for the night. In the morning two of the five rangers set
off to follow a honey bird, leaving three to guard the prisoner.
'About 9 a.m.' Constable Cement Mathlabi later reported,
'I noticed that our camp was surrounded by Portuguese
natives from over the border - about forty or fifty, all
men armed with sticks and loaded sticks, two had guns and
some had assegais. The guns were rifles. Without a gword
they all surrounded us, closed in and assaulted us.'
The assailants were from the Maplankwene district and many of them
were known to the rangers. Significantly, at least five of the rescue
party were South African subjects who had taken refuge in Portuguese
East Africa to avoid 'punishment for offences committed while residing
in the game reserve. ' Two of them were former game reserve policemen
discharged for ' ill-conduct' and of one of these, Mashashi Gumbany,
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Stevenson-Hamilton wrote that he was, 'a very dangerous character1.
1
 These people surrounded us • , Cement Mathlabi reported,
'closed on us and assaulted us. They did not say a word.
Stephanus was first struck with a loaded stick ... and he
fell to the ground. I then received a blow which felled
me, on the right side of the face next the eye. I was
struck with a loaded stick by Mashashe Matebula. (The
second ex-game reserve constable among the raiding party).
I became unconcious for a time, I came to and got up. I
saw Stephanus dead on the ground ...•
The raiders, having dismissed the idea of handcuffing Mathlabi and
taking him back with them into Portuguese territory told him, 'You can
go now, as we have given you enough.' A third member of the ranger's
party managed to escape unharmed and while the two returning from
their search for honey were also chased, they managed to escape
assault.
Before the poachers' rescue party struck, the rangers had all
removed their uniforms and were dressed only in loincloths. Their
assailants consequently made off with five uniforms, four pairs of
handcuffs, a gold wristlet and some £9 in cash. Significantly they
also took a Lee Mitford rifle and four cartridges, which by that date
had been issued to certain constables to meet the rising emergency.
There can be little doubt that the significance of the episode must
largely be lost if we see it merely in terms of a narrow preser-
vationist programme. The game rangers may have been patrolling to
prevent the poaching of endangered species, but they were also intent
upon thwarting their 'enemies'. To the magistrate in Pilgrim's Rest
who later investigated the episode, the solution lay in the establish-
ment of posts manned by the South African Police. While these should
be established in order to ensure the 'preservation of the peace (and)
the checking of raids,1 he said, they would also make it possible, 'to
keep an eye on the native game rangers of the Park.'
